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PREVIEW; State v. Mefford: Scope of Consent Searches in a
Digitalized World
Spencer Pedemonte
The Montana Supreme Court will review argument en banc in State
v. Mefford. Chad Wright and Kristen L. Peterson submitted briefs on
behalf of the defendant and appellant, Bradley Mefford. Austin Knudsen,
Tammy K. Plubell, Jonathan Krauss, Eileen Joyce and Samm Cox
submitted a brief on behalf of the plaintiff and appellee, the State of
Montana. The Court has also granted Alex Rate of the American Civil
Liberties Union of Montana and Brett Max Kaufman of the American
Civil Liberties Union leave to participate as Amici Curiae.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Mefford, the Court is asked to determine whether a
parolee’s federal and state constitutional rights were violated when a
parole officer switched between applications while conducting a search of
the parolee’s phone. In dispute is whether the parolee consented to the
search of only the Facebook Messenger app or other apps, which contained
child pornography.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of Saturday, November 26, 2016, Bradley
Mefford (“Mefford”) left his apartment building to sit in his car in the
apartment’s parking lot.1 Mefford’s GPS monitor alerted Parole Officer
Jake Miller to his curfew violation of being outside his residence from
12:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m.2 P.O. Miller attempted to call Mefford, but his
phone was disconnected.3
Three days after the violation, on November 29, 2016, Mefford had
a scheduled parole reporting day.4 Parole Officers Finley and Miller
arrived at Mefford’s residence to conduct a home check.5 P.O. Finley
inquired about the curfew violation, and Mefford explained he was sitting
in his car in the parking lot to obtain better Wi-Fi so he could message his
daughter, Faith.6 Skeptical of his story, P.O. Miller asked Mefford if he
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“could view the phone to confirm his story.”7 Mefford instructed his
girlfriend to give his phone to P.O. Miller “so [he could] show him the
messages from the time and date that was of concern.”8
P.O. Miller looked at Mefford’s Facebook Messenger app and found
messages consistent with the time period in question.9 P.O. Miller
remained skeptical of Mefford’s story, however, because “the profile
picture associated with Faith’s Messenger account didn’t appear to be a
younger female like he had described.”10 P.O. Miller then opened the
photo gallery on Mefford’s phone “to confirm that his daughter was the
person sending these messages.”11
Upon P.O. Miller’s search of Mefford’s photo gallery, he observed
photos that he knew were “not . . . right.”12 P.O. Miller saw photos of
“young females who were nude, or young children that were in sexual acts
with animals.”13 The officers immediately detained Mefford.14 His phone
was seized and turned over to law enforcement.15
In April of 2018, the State charged Mefford with one count of sexual
abuse of children, under Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-625(1)(e) (2015), for
possessing photographic images of child pornography.16 Mefford filed a
motion to “suppress any evidence resulting from the search of his phone,
which served as the basis for later search warrants.”17 The district court
denied his motion.18 The case proceeded to trial, and Mefford was found
guilty.19
III.
A.

ARGUMENTS

Appellant’s Arguments

On appeal, Mefford argues the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the search of his photo app was a warrantless
intrusion violating Montana law, the Montana Constitution, and the United
States Constitution.20
First, Mefford argues P.O. Miller exceeded the scope of Mefford’s
consent. Mefford argues that the scope of consent is measured by the
7

Id. at 6.
Id.
9
Id. at 7.
10
Id. (quoting Trial Tr. at 11, Jan. 7, 2019) (internal quotations omitted).
11
Id. at 8 (quoting Trial Tr. at 11, Jan. 7, 2019) (internal quotations omitted).
12
Id. (quoting Trial Tr. at 11–12, Jan. 7, 2019).
13
Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting Trial Tr. at 12, Jan. 7, 2019).
14
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 8.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 1; Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1.
17
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 11.
8

2022

PREVIEW: State v. Mefford

3

standard of “objective” reasonableness21 and that this standard is of a
“typical reasonable person, not a typical reasonable police officer.”22 In
addition, “the scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed
object.”23
Here, Mefford argues P.O. Miller exceeded his scope of consent by
going beyond the Facebook Messenger app.24 Mefford argues his consent
could “not reasonably be understood to extend to his personal photo
gallery”25 when he told P.O. Miller the “particular place (Facebook
Messenger), the particular time, and the particular person” to confirm his
explanation for the curfew violation.26
Next, Mefford contends the State cannot justify a warrantless
intrusion of his phone based on the conditions of his supervision. Mont.
Admin. R. 20.7.1101(7) states “[u]pon reasonable suspicion that the
offender has violated the conditions of supervision, a probation and parole
officer may search the person, vehicle, and residence of the offender.”27
Mefford maintains the search was not based on a “reasonable suspicion”
of illegal activity, and P.O. Miller therefore violated Mont. Admin. R.
20.7.1101(7).28
B.

Appellee’s Arguments

In response, the State argues the denial of Mefford’s motion to
suppress should be affirmed because the district court’s findings were not
clearly erroneous.
First, the State notes the Montana Supreme Court reviews motions to
suppress evidence only when the lower court’s findings of fact are
considered clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are considered clearly
erroneous only if the lower court definitively misapprehended evidence.29
In appeals concerning motions to suppress, the Montana Supreme Court’s
function is not to reevaluate evidence, but instead to defer to lower courts’
interpretations and review those de novo.30
The State then argues that the district court’s finding that Mefford
consented to the search of his phone is not clearly erroneous. P.O. Miller
asked Mefford if he could “view the phone to confirm his story,” which
constitutes a request for permission.31 At trial, both officers testified
21
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Mefford consented by giving permission to “look through his phone” and
“search his phone.”32 The State contends that the district court’s findings
were not clearly erroneous because ample evidence implied that Mefford’s
consent to viewing the phone was not limited to only the Facebook
Messenger app, despite Mefford’s conflicting testimony.33
Finally, the State argues the district court’s finding that the officers
had reasonable cause to search Mefford’s phone was also not clearly
erroneous. The State claims that the Montana Supreme Court does not
need to evaluate whether the officers performed an invalid probation or
parole search because Mefford’s only contention at the suppression
hearing was whether they exceeded his consent.34 The State asserts the
Montana Supreme Court will not address an issue raised for the first time
upon appeal; therefore, Mefford’s argument of an invalid search is
“unnecessary and irrelevant” to consider here.35
C.

Amicus Curiae Arguments

In support of the defendant-appellant, the American Civil Liberties
Union of Montana and the American Civil Liberties Union (collectively
“ACLU”) offer two arguments: (1) Due to an ability to generate, store, and
access large amounts of personal information, cell phones require
“heightened constitutional protections against warrantless searches,
analysis, and storage”; and (2) “Consent-based searches of digital data
must be narrowly scoped to the owner’s explicit permission.”36
First, the ACLU argues constitutional privacy protections require
narrowly circumscribed warrants (or exceptions to the warrant
requirement) for cell phone searches because they contain vast quantities
of personal information. Relying heavily on Riley v. California,37 the
ACLU argues cell phones are distinct from any other object because of
their “immense storage capacity,” and therefore, “implicate privacy
concerns far beyond” traditional objects.38 Law enforcement’s use of
advanced forensic tools to easily extract, analyze, and store a suspect’s
information exacerbates “privacy harms [for] warrantless, unjustified
searches.”39
Next, the ACLU argues consent-based searches of digital data apply
only to areas specified by the owner. The ACLU contends Mefford
32
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consented only to a search of a single message thread in Facebook
Messenger to corroborate his story, yet P.O. Miller developed his own
“unannounced rationale to search through Mefford’s photos app.”40
Furthermore, the ACLU argues common knowledge of how cell phones
work creates reasonable distinctions between consenting to a search of a
messaging app from a sweeping search of other personal information.41
This is important because when dealing with cell phones, consent searches
raise unique and important concerns for coercion by law enforcement.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Court’s decision here will have huge implications on an
individual’s privacy regarding police searches. As we transition to a
digitally dominated society, the amount of information stored on
electronic devices will continue to grow exponentially. Allowing officers
access to the breadth of information contained on a cell phone creates a
troubling precedent and infringes on state and federal constitutional rights.
Here, the Court will likely find that P.O. Miller exceeded Mefford’s
consent to search the Facebook Messenger app and that case law supports
Mefford’s arguments.
A. Scope of Consent Exception to Traditional Warrants
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of “their persons,
houses, papers, and effects.”42 This right, however, may be waived and an
individual may consent to a search of their property by officers acting
outside of the Fourth Amendment constraints.43
The scope of an officer’s search is controlled by the degree of consent
given by the individual. As noted in the Appellant’s Opening Brief, scope
is measured by “that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the
typical person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect?”44 For example, consent given to search a car’s trunk does not
give consent to search the interior of the car, nor does it give consent to
search the defendant’s person outside of the car. Additionally, the burden
of proving scope and voluntariness of the consent falls on the
prosecution.45

40

Id. at 14.
Id. at 18–19.
42
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973).
44
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982));
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17.
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Here, Mefford’s contention that P.O. Miller exceeded the scope of
his consent is valid. Mefford does not deny he consented to the search of
his phone—he clearly offered his phone as evidence—however, only the
Facebook Messenger app contained proof of his actions that evening. A
typical person would have understood P.O. Miller wanted to search the
Facebook Messenger app to corroborate the story, yet P.O. Miller, after
reading the corroborating discussion on the Facebook Messenger app,
went through Mefford’s photo app. Due to the vastness of content a cell
phone can store, the Court will likely hold the district court was clearly
erroneous in denying Mefford’s motion to suppress.
B. Case Law Supports Mefford’s Arguments
While the State offers the strong procedural argument that the
Montana Supreme Court should defer to lower courts’ decisions when
reviewing motions to suppress, the Court will need to address two cases
contradictory to the district court’s decision.
First, at trial, much of the State’s argument relied on the criteria in
State v. Peoples;46 however, Mefford argues that the State failed to apply
them to the facts of this case.47 The Court in Peoples determined a
warrantless probation or parole search is valid only when three criteria are
met:
(1) the search is generally authorized by an established state law
regulatory scheme that furthers the special government interests in
rehabilitating probationers and protecting the public; (2) the probation
officer has reasonable cause to suspect, based on awareness of
articulable facts, under the totality of the circumstances that the
probationer may be in violation of his or her probation conditions or
the criminal law; and, (3) the warrantless search must be limited in
scope to the reasonable suspicion that justified it in the first instance
except to the extent that new or additional cause may arise within the
lawful scope of the initial search.48

Mefford is correct in noting that the plain language of Mont. Admin. R.
20.7.1101(7) does not authorize the search of a “cell phone,” and therefore,
the search here fails the first criteria under Peoples.49 Mefford also
convincingly maintains that the search must be limited to and based on a
probation violation, yet P.O. Miller went outside the confirmation he was
seeking in Facebook Messenger and never directly identified what parole
violations Mefford violated.50

46

502 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2022).
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Next, both Mefford and the ACLU correctly argue that the Court
must consider the United States Supreme Court ruling in Riley. Both argue
that the United States Supreme Court “has never upheld a state law
authorizing a search of a probationer’s or parolee’s cell phone without a
warrant or a showing of probable cause.”51 Therefore, Riley is the most
relevant precedent. The Riley Court discusses at length the importance of
considering the degree to which warrantless searches intrude upon an
individual’s privacy.52
Although the issue in Riley surrounds a different warrantless search
exception—search incident to lawful arrest—and some of Mefford and the
ACLU’s comparisons are a stretch, the Montana Supreme Court will likely
consider Riley in making their decision. The United States Supreme Court
notes that cell phones are now a pervasive and insistent part of daily life,
raising privacy implications regarding their immense storage capacity.53
Here, the Montana Supreme Court will likely find a minor, albeit
technical, curfew violation and a limited consent to search will not justify
P.O. Miller’s ability to search Mefford’s “personal photos, text messages,
emails, location data, financial information, political news, or health
information.”54
V.

CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mefford will likely
define the contours of law enforcement’s ability to search cell phones and
other electronic devices, which could greatly impact Montanans’ right to
privacy. The Court will likely find the district court erred in denying
Mefford’s motion to suppress because P.O. Miller exceeded Mefford’s
consent to search and because case law supports Mefford’s arguments.
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